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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
Cryptocurrencies as an Alternative to Fiat Monetary Systems

The recent popularity of cryptocurrencies is largely associated with a particular
application referred to as Bitcoin. Cryptocurrency has a mix of properties that make it
difficult to examine. These properties consist of being infinitely divisible, durable,
transferable, fungible and can be controlled to be artificially scarce. Further,
cryptocurrencies can act as a means of payment, a medium of exchange, a store of value,
and a unit of account. This thesis will analyze the technical features underlying
cryptocurrencies and find out whether or not they can function as an alternative to fiat
money. Since Bitcoin is the most commonly understood application I will examine it
from two antithetical economic frameworks. Austrian monetary theory and Modern
Monetary Theory have been selected to study because of their different views on the
functions and origin of money. I will explore their interpretations of money to gain
insight and make a general conclusion on whether or not Bitcoin could operate as an
alternative to fiat money.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Cryptocurrency is a term that has divided opinions on its usefulness and functionality as a
medium of exchange. The recent rise in recognition of cryptocurrencies is largely
associated with a particular application referred to as Bitcoin. It serves as a virtual
currency and payment system that uses a publicly accessible, immutable, and secured
ledger. Since it is a virtual currency there are no tangible units that mimic the
functionality of state created currency. Bitcoin does not have any central control,
repository of data, management, or single point of failure (such as a data center).
Everything on the Bitcoin network is voluntarily ran by individuals with access to a
computer. It is a peer-to-peer (P2P) network with no single administrator for the issuance
or redemption of its units.1 Those who decide to use Bitcoin place their trust and
confidence into technology and cryptography. These two attributes seemingly keep the
network secure and are all that is backing it. Cryptocurrency has a mix of properties that
make it difficult to classify. They are divisible, durable, transferable, fungible, artificially
scarce, and, they can act as a means of payment, medium of exchange, store of value, and
a unit of account. It is an interesting idea to consider the consequences of replacing fiat
currency with virtual currency. If cryptocurrencies displace fiat currencies new
institutions will have to be created and traditional establishments will have to adapt. In
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P2P: A network of interconnected computers for sharing information that is based on a
distributed architecture
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many ways, government control defines the circulatory process of fiat money and
cryptocurrencies may challenge that control.
The objective of this thesis is to examine the technical features underlying
cryptocurrency and find out whether they can serve as an alternative to fiat money. The
former will be accomplished through an analysis on the most common cryptocurrency —
Bitcoin. In order to analyze its potential as an alternative to fiat money this research
delves into two divergent economic approaches. Austrian monetary theory and Modern
Monetary Theory have been chosen because of their different views on the functions and
origin of money. The former believes money is a market phenomena and the latter
assumes money is a creation of the state. These two theoretical approaches are different
enough that I believe they can offer useful insights that help highlight the nuances in the
complexity of monetary systems. My goal is to explore their interpretations of money,
and then examine if Bitcoin can be an alternative to fiat money. This paper will examine
their monetary theories and argue in favor of cryptocurrencies as an alternative to fiat
money.
Generally speaking, Bitcoin is a culmination of some already existing
developments: an electronic currency system, a security protocol, and a computer
application that embeds these two items.2 The protocol is inherently deterministic
because a set of computer algorithms decides on the time and place of issuance for its
respective units. Users on the network contribute by participating in the verification of
transactions and are rewarded. Whenever a user on the network provides the solution to
the mathematical problem required by the process of verification they receive the reward.
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See Satoshi Nakamoto’s whitepaper for a more thorough understanding of the protocol.
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Chapter 2 will indulge into further detail on the technical features of Bitcoin and the
socioeconomic factors surrounding it.
From the surface, the Austrian economics tradition should find cryptocurrency as
a viable alternative to fiat money because it has the power to weaken central authority. If
cryptocurrency is widely adopted it could disrupt the monopolization that governments
hold over the issuance of currency. The deterministic nature of the Bitcoin protocol
should also be attractive to the Austrian tradition for having a level of predictably
regarding the supply of its unit that central banks do not have. Despite these factors, there
is some controversy on Bitcoin within the Austrian tradition, which depends on an
interpretation of their theory on the origins of money. Chapter 3 will review relevant
Austrian literature, their view of money, the regression theorem and their complications
with cryptocurrency.
Modern Monetary Theory, a tradition within Post Keynesian economics, provides
different insights into a range of theoretical and policy issues including the theory of
money and monetary policy. Austrians emphasize the importance of free markets that
allow voluntary individuals to exercise their willpower through capital for the production
of goods or services over others. It follows that they believe exchange-values based on
supply and demand will guarantee an efficient allocation of resources. This means that
central planning could distort this process and misallocate resources creating more issues
later down the road. On the other hand, Modern Monetary Theorists believe that a
monetarily sovereign government is not budget-constrained in the same way as
individuals. This is because a monetarily sovereign government produces its own
currency meaning it can always pay its liabilities by creating the money. Hence, Modern
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Monetary Theory proposes that fears based on insolvency do not make any sense in a
fiat-system with a monopolistic issuer. In this situation, a central bank holds significant
power over the allocation of resources in the economy. Their position relies on the unique
abilities of money that is not constrained like a commodity. If state-issued money is not
backed by a tangible good the central bank can concentrate on objectives such as inflation
targeting and full employment by manipulating the supply and distribution of currency.
They believe that Bitcoin is a P2P network with a unit of account that appears to
resemble a commodity more than a monetary instrument. This causes a lot of issues for
the Modern Monetary Theory framework since there is no issuer within the Bitcoin
network that is liable for its units or control over the circulating supply. The nature of this
argument will be discussed and critiqued in further detail throughout Chapter 4.
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether or not cryptocurrency can be a
viable alternative to fiat money. The hope is that by investigating the technical attributes
of Bitcoin and two unique monetary theories, I will have a scope broad enough to
satisfactorily answer this question. This will be fleshed out in the concluding chapter with
final remarks on the previously discussed economic approaches. Further, practical
implications relating to the similarities and differences between cryptocurrency and fiat
money will be presented. Along these lines, my overall argument will be summarized.

4

Chapter 2
What is Bitcoin?

Bitcoin is a virtual system that allows digital payments to be handled peer-to-peer in a
decentralized manner that does not require a traditional financial intermediary. As of
March 2018, there are more than 16.94 million bitcoin units in circulation with a market
capitalization of $249.54 billion (Blockchain 2018).3 The first public appearance of
Bitcoin was in Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System. It was published by a
computer programmer under the alias Satoshi Nakamoto in October 2008 who claimed to
provide a payment network and digital unit that exists as an alternative to traditional fiat
money systems (Nakamoto 2008).
For convenience, Bitcoin with an uppercase ‘B’ will refer to the peer-to-peer
decentralized network that is a protocol to clear transactions in a ‘trust-less’ environment.
‘BTC’ will refer to the unit of account on the network and serves, among other things, as
a means for exchange. These two components cannot exist without each other. The
Bitcoin network does not operate without the BTC unit and vice versa. In January 2009,
the open-source client for Bitcoin was activated with an issuance of the first BTC units.
Before the launch of the Bitcoin network there were other digital payment systems such
as the ‘ecash’ and ‘hashcash’ protocol. The first proposal for a decentralized and scarce
cryptocurrency, similar to Bitcoin, was Nick Szabo’s ‘bit gold’ in 1998. There are a
growing number of retailers accepting BTC for payment, such as Microsoft.com,
Overstock.com, Expedia.com, Newegg.com, and Bloomberg.com. Further, certain startup
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Calculated by taking the price of a unit and multiplying it by its total circulating supply.
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companies have developed ways for Bitcoin users to trade with retailers who do not
natively accept it.
Many other virtual currencies have come into existence, enjoying minimal use
before failing. Bitcoin has survived for nearly a decade and has caught the attention of
mainstream financial institutions (Velde 2013). The destiny of Bitcoin as a globally
adopted payment system is still uncertain, but the technology behind it (the blockchain
and hash functions) have the potential to innovate many different sectors in the
economy.4 These potential applications could change the nature of any service or activity
that requires a trusted third party for mediation. Bitcoin is not unique in the sense that it
can operate as a digital accounting system. The novelty of Bitcoin is that there is no
single entity controlling the system because it is a decentralized network. Market actors
are not forced to run specific software and they still can agree on the state of the system.
There can be no disagreement on matters of ownership and simultaneously there is no
central authority to enforce property rights. This ability to be treating each market actor
the same and remove the necessity of a middleman to ensure security has far-reaching
implications that will be discussed later.
Bitcoin has been growing in the last decade and researchers have barely had the
chance to examine what its growth means for society. There is a growing necessity to
examine Bitcoin and the blockchain from a socioeconomic perspective to understand the
underlying technology and its social implications. This requires a primer of the technical
traits of cryptocurrency that could make them a useful tool for understanding and
improving how contemporary monetary systems function. This paper will explore the

4

See “The Essence of Bitcoin and the Blockchain” by Michael Scott for more detail.
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technology underlying Bitcoin, different economic approaches and their understanding of
money, in order to gauge the potential of a cryptocurrency, such as Bitcoin, as an
alternative to money.

2.1 A Trustless System

Different virtual currencies have been developed for a variety of motivations, but the
development of this technology is mainly associated with libertarian ideology for its
supposed potential to avoid government oversight, centralized or state-backed financial,
monetary and taxation methods, and thus enable more liberal markets (Karlstrom 2014).
However, this is not the only ideological view associated with the use of virtual
currencies, as even socialist rhetoric can find use-cases in blockchain technology (Huckle
and White 2016).
Generally speaking, it is a distrust of modern governmental authorities and
financial institutions that has provided motivation for the use and development of peer-topeer systems as an alternative to government-backed fiat money systems.5 The purpose of
a peer-to-peer system is to permit individuals to engage in direct-exchange without the
necessity of a trusted third party. Nakamoto (2008) refers to the Bitcoin protocol as a
“trustless” system, but that is not necessarily true. The protocol requires trust from its
users in its ability to function. If its functionality is intact and users can engage in trade
without a third party it can gain more adoption. Nonetheless, the necessity of trust to
establish a medium of exchange still exists for Bitcoin, but it shifts hands from a

5

See “Bitcoin: A Primer” by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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centralized authority to members operating within a network. This begs the question of
what is a medium of exchange? In the past, mediums of exchange ranged from cattle,
barley, salt, cowrie shells, gold, silver, and even wives. A medium is the manifestation of
a commodity’s market exchange value expressed in a form accepted, with faith, by a
collective. In this way, a medium of exchange is a social construct, an institution, in
which the worth of a diverse set of commodities can be represented by a unique
commodity, promise, token, or even a digital record of account. Such is the case that the
US dollar has value because the US government is trusted in its capacity to broaden its
power internationally and accept it as a payment for taxes. This could mean that a
medium of exchange utilized by a peer-to-peer system could be valued if users trust the
system.
It would not be much of a stretch to assume that certain people do not trust the
government in making decisions that benefit the interest of the population. In fact, there
is a case to be made that fiat systems benefit the interest of financiers and governments
over other interests (Vigna & Casey 2015). Coincidentally, Bitcoin was released
following the economic crisis of 2008. Based on the protocol and comments by the
creator, it could be said that Bitcoin was designed with a degree of distrust in mind.
Nakamoto posted a comment on a forum board that exhibits motivations for an
alternative monetary system that could enable more trust from its users (2009).

The root problem with conventional currency is all the trust that’s
required to make it work. The central bank must be trusted not to debase
the currency, but the history of fiat currencies is full of breaches of that
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trust. Banks must be trusted to hold our money and transfer it
electronically, but they lend it out in waves of credit bubbles with barely
a fraction in reserve. We have to trust them with our privacy, trust them
to not let identity thieves drain our accounts. Their massive overhead
costs make micropayments impossible.

Nakamoto’s reasons can be seen as expressing beliefs of many groups, such as,
libertarians, open-source communities, and crypto-anarchists (Wallace 2011). The term
‘trustless’ is misleading because even though no trust in a centralized institution to
perform the role of verification is needed, users are required to trust the protocol and
other actors in the network. In this way, trust is not eliminated but transferred from one
component of the system to other parts.
The US dollar is universally accepted internationally due to the political prowess
of the US government and the trust of its users in the Federal Reserve to maintain the
integrity of its money tokens. Inappropriate decision-making, such as excessive creation
of currency without concern for inflation or the practice of debasement, erodes the trust
placed in the system by the users. Proponents of cryptocurrencies claim that blockchain
based protocols could handle the role of the state more effectively (Grinberg 2011). The
way in which Bitcoin handles the issuance of BTC will be discussed in the following
section.
It is not only libertarian communities that are critical of the issues arising from the
power-relations between government, central banks and financial institutions. The case
can be made that more effective and trustworthy institutions could solve these issues.

9

Intermediary institutions requiring trust such as banks and lenders spend a lot of effort in
conflict resolution and fraud, which appear in transaction costs for users (Nakamoto
2008). Most merchants are charged around 2% every time they process a transaction and
transferring money internationally can incur even higher costs (Freund 2008). Even in an
era of increasing globalization many individuals are excluded from modern banking. A
recent report found that 75% of the global population below the poverty line cannot
access a banking institution but have access to mobile network services (World Bank
2012a, 2012b). A cryptocurrency system that reduces the cost of transactions and can
integrate those who are denied access to modern financial institutions could attract a lot
of demand (Alstyne 2014).

2.2 How Bitcoin Works

The reasons for the creation of a virtual currency system and the philosophy for how to
govern it are at best ambiguous. However, all cryptocurrency protocols rely upon
encryption for the sake of security. Hence, these types of virtual currencies and their
network are referred to as ‘cryptocurrencies.’ There were many issues regarding the
security of predecessors of Bitcoin, but a unique issue was the prevention of “double
spending” (Dwyer 2015). This was a major problem because it allowed users to create
counterfeit units. A double-spending attack happens when a user manages to spend their
unit, receive service or goods, and then manipulate the transaction ledger to revert the
transaction. Accordingly, the user maintains their balance while being able to
continuously exploit services. Before Bitcoin, cryptocurrency systems solved the issue in
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a familiar way, by using a centralized clearing mechanism to verify and prevent
counterfeiting. Traditional financial institutions use a method requiring trusted
intermediation to authenticate transactions and mediate conflict when a user tries to
commit fraud.
Nakamoto (2008) provides a set of arguments as to how the Bitcoin system is
resistant to double-spending attacks without a third party institution. This was achieved
with the development of the blockchain. A blockchain can be defined as an immutable
public ledger that logs the necessary amount of work — performed by a computer but
initiated and maintained by the labor of a person — to prove that a virtual item, such as
BTC, is inimitable and authentic (Tapscott 2016). Specifically, Nakamoto designed
Bitcoin so that when a user waits a certain number of blocks for a transaction to appear
on the blockchain, by nodes (or miners), then the probability of an attack that modifies
the public blockchain decreases. The larger the amount of blocks the user waits the more
resources the attacker would have to expend. In the Bitcoin white-paper Nakamoto
models an attacker and a group of honest players taking probabilistic steps towards a
similar direction. Nakamoto indicates that the number of blocks the user waits before
placing their transaction on the blockchain is sufficient to make certain that the
probability an attacker can catch up with the honest users is negligible.
Nakamoto created a protocol that requires the participating community to be
responsible for doing the work necessary to verify that each transaction is genuine and
public. The work performed by a node rather than a traditional intermediary verifies the
exchanges between buyers and sellers. The argument is that the network removes the
necessity of third parties and therefore reduces the cost of transactions. The incentive for
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users on the network to complete the work required to verify exchanges is receiving
newly minted currency and transaction fees.
In this fashion, Bitcoin can be viewed as a self-governing system for securely
transferring digital objects between users. Bitcoin is a network of nodes (which are users
voluntarily running the software), that collectively perform the functions of a
clearinghouse, using a virtual unit (BTC), while also recording every transaction
occurring on the network and publicly broadcasting them. It may be helpful to think of it
as an instrument akin to the widely used Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). TCP is
used to deliver information between applications running on different computers that are
communicating through an Internet Protocol (IP) network. Common applications that
require the use of TCP are email, file transfers, remote access, and virtually everything on
the web. In the same way that TCP/IP is at the bottom of our Internet the Bitcoin
blockchain is the lower layer of the cryptosphere.6 As the Internet has become more
developers apps and protocols have been built on top of it adding layers with more
functionality. Protocols such as HTTP allow users to build websites, which has changed
the way people share information. Developers taking advantage of the open-source nature
of Bitcoin can build atop of the Bitcoin blockchain, creating layers of functionality for
the convenience of users. These extra layers will derive their value and be dependent on
the capabilities of the Bitcoin network.
Ultimately, blockchain technology can be seen as an accounting mechanism.
Blockchain based systems, such as Bitcoin, exist as a piece of software that runs on
user’s computers and communicates with each other over the internet to reach consensus

6

I use ‘cryptosphere’ to refer to the whole cryptocurrency ecosystem
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on the integrity of an accounting ledger. The software has copies of every transaction that
has been completed within the system since its beginning and are updated approximately
every ten minutes. If a users ledger differs from other users on the network it is replaced
with a copy by the general consensus. To corrupt the system, one would need to control
more resources than over half the network and to modify it in precisely the same way
across the majority. Arguably, if a corrupt actor had access to that many resources the
incentive to verify transactions could prevent malicious behavior (Nakamoto 2008).
A fundamental component to validating transactions is for users to provide
‘proof.’ This is done through a mechanism referred to as the ‘proof-of-work’ method.
Nakamoto suggests that this is a form of representation in decision-making on
verification. The proof-of-work is established by users solving a cryptographic puzzle.
Each user contributes their computing power to compete in verifying transactions.
Nakamoto (2008) refers to this as “one-CPU-one-vote,” because the block that “has the
greatest proof-of-work effort invested in it” represents the decision of the majority in
verification In order to alter a block of transactions, an attacker has to change not only the
block their transaction occurs in, but also every single block preceding it. In the future,
technology may improve, increasing the speed of computer hardware, which may change
the demand for nodes (miners) or create security issues. This is why Nakamoto (2008)
designed the protocol to change the difficulty of mining by a “moving average targeting
an average number of blocks per hour.” This means that if BTC is being created too
quickly the cryptographic puzzle becomes harder to solve. Nakamoto defines the process
of creating BTC in the following order (2008):
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1. New transactions are broadcast to all nodes (users running the
software).
2. Each node collects new transactions into a block.
3. Each node works on finding a difficult proof-of-work for its block.
4. When a node finds a proof-of-work, it broadcasts the blocks to all
nodes.
5. Nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid and not
already spent.
6. Nodes express their acceptance of the block by working on creating
the next block in the chain, using the hash of the accepting block as
the previous hash.

Basically pseudo-anonymous participants commonly called miners maintain the
ledger. The term miner, to describe nodes, is seemingly used because it is a familiar word
and a way to describe something new in an easy way. The miners use computing power
to maintain the integrity of the network and extend the blockchain (the immutable public
ledger of transactions). Anyone with a computer and access to the Internet can become a
miner and take part in the network as a node. The protocol requires nodes to solve
cryptographic puzzles, which is a process similar to brute-forcing (a cryptographic hash
algorithm), in order to organize new blocks on the blockchain (Nakamoto 2008).7 Blocks
represent groupings of voluntary transactions. Buyers publicly broadcast transactions for
nodes to place into the blocks they create. Nodes create a type of final demand for BTC
7

Brute forcing refers to a method of trial and error used by agents to access otherwise
inaccessible data.
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by being forced to receive it for maintaining the blockchain. The miners that work on
verifying a block of transactions compete with other nodes and whoever solves the
cryptographic puzzle faster is rewarded.
Each node repeats the competitive process of truncating every transaction into a
block that occurs about every ten minutes (Nakamoto 2008). Only the first transaction of
a unique user can be integrated within a particular block by a node hence users who try to
double spend their BTC within a single block are rejected. The first node to integrate
recent transactions into a new block on the chain must complete an arbitrarily determined
criterion of finding a specific hash that satisfies the requirement to be verified. BTC does
not exist in a material form and is prevalent only in the Bitcoin network. A user possesses
a set of cryptographic keys to access BTC and modify his/her ownership, implying that
the users do not actually own the ‘coin’ itself. In order to store BTC users download
digital wallets for their cryptographic keys. Just like hard cash, if a user loses access to
their keys, due to theft, deletion, or misplacement, the user loses the rights to the BTC.
This has influenced the development of start-up businesses for secure wallet services, and
at this layer of the cryptosphere, trust with an institution re-emerges as a relevant issue.
The UK government defined Bitcoin as “ an asset database that can be shared
across a network of multiple sites, geographies or institutions” (Government Office for
Science, 2016). This view fails to acknowledge that blockchain is more than a traditional
asset database since it allows users to securely collaborate without a central authority.
Smart-contracts and the capability of signing preconditions for exchange to occur; users
are able to delay a transaction until mutually agreed upon conditions are met (Such as a
strike price, expiration date, or funding goal). The transaction with conditions is added to
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a pending pool of transactions when created and the system determines if it is satisfied
without a real-world third party. Smart-contracts allow users to transfer value, assets,
property, shares or virtually anything that can be represented by a token without a
middleman. In a way, these are self-executing contracts that use computer algorithms to
store and supervise agreements between users. Smart-contracts allow the blockchain to
execute scripts that can help automate a plethora of activities that require a contract (Eris
Industries 2016). Finally, the blockchain is an open-source publicly shared and
immutable ledger that can be examined by anyone but not manipulated by a single entity
(Nakamoto 2008). The final result of a transaction is arguably a secure, safe, transfer of
digital objects verified by participants on the network without a centralized clearing
house processing the transfers.

2.3 The Challenges of Regulation

It may be too soon to determine whether Bitcoin is a speculative mania that will fade with
time or an emerging alternative to fiat with the potential to lubricate a financial
revolution. Be that as it may, it is beginning to grab the attention of governments and the
financial sector. In 2013, JPMorgan Chase & Co filed 175 claims to patent a “BitcoinAlternative” which were all denied (Durden 2013). In January 2014 the New York State
Department of Financial Services convened to decide on how to approach regulating
Bitcoin and in July began enforcing regulation for the first time (Ember 2014a). Later
that year in October, the US Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network that established cryptocurrency exchanges as money transmitters that must
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follow standard regulation (FinCEN 2014). China has gone back and forth on restricting
financial institutions from engaging in trading BTC (Bloomberg 2013), while the US
government auctioned 30,000 BTC from an illegal free-market experiment on the dark
web (Ember 2014b).
Government’s approaches to cryptocurrency reflect the uncertain nature of
cryptocurrencies and the difficulties of regulating something like Bitcoin. How should a
government define Bitcoin? Is it a currency, a commodity, or a security? Is it a financial,
monetary, or equity instrument? The Internal Revenue Service determined that BTC
should be considered property for the sake of taxation (IRS 2014). Recognizing BTC as a
legitimate alternative to government-backed fiat money could be viewed as a threat to the
power that defines monetarily sovereign governments (refer to U.S Const., Art. I., Sec.
8). If a government decided to outlaw Bitcoin they could force users under their
authoritative rule to stop operating as nodes. However, since Bitcoin is a decentralized
network it can exist as immaterial software all over the globe. Therefore, “It’s not clear if
Bitcoin is legal, but there is no company to control and no one to arrest” (Davis 2015).
This pliancy provides great challenge for regulators (Rainer, Christian, Edelmen &
Moore 2016).
Bitcoin encounters further complications with current regulatory frameworks
when considering transactions between different countries. Imagine a situation where the
US imposes sanctions on Cuba and simultaneously the EU enables freer trade with Cuba.
The market actor in the EU should have no legal obstacle in the way of investing in a
Cuban company. However, transferring money from the EU to Cuba could still be
refused due to the fear of the sanctions in the US — depending on the political
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relationships between banks in the EU and the US. In this situation, Bitcoin could be used
as a means to transfer capital between countries while avoiding the political
complications of the respective systems. In a traditional financial institution there is a
chain of banks that must each agree to accept a transaction and if one of them denies the
claim then the whole transaction is blocked.

2.4 Summary

Cryptocurrency has recently emerged and is continuously evolving; yet it already
displays potential to change the nature of exchange. The cryptosphere has a broad variety
of layers specialized for different functions that may have far-ranging effects on multiple
industries. Bitcoin is not only a protocol operating as a channel for users to transfer value
from one party to another. It has many features and due to its open-source nature anyone
can contribute and alter its development path. As mentioned earlier, three quarter of the
worlds poor cannot access modern finance institutions but have access to cellular devices
Bitcoin can provide a secure method of storing value for citizens of countries who cannot
access banks. The network protects against fraud, providing users with protection against
chargebacks or unwanted chargebacks; BTC are impossible to counterfeit. Using an
encrypted hardware wallet can make it even more difficult for people to steal or lose their
money. Bitcoin facilitates global participation by allowing transactions to become more
interoperable. Any individual, firm, or bank can securely send and receive payments
using the network. By means of cryptography, secure payments can be executed without
a trusted intermediary. This can change the way cross-border transfers occur, potentially
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making them more cost-efficient. With the implementation of smart-contracts users can
run a crowd-funding campaign and Bitcoin will prevent any transaction until a certain
level of pledges or conditions are met. Nakamoto (2008) mentions micro-payments as
being impractical with modern banking institutions; on the Bitcoin network users can
create contracts to send repeated and small transactions to another party. These contracts
can also be used for dispute mediation. This is achieved by using multiple signatures
from different actors to verify transactions and resolve dispute without any of them
having control over the other persons money. The usage of multiple signatures allows the
network to determine if the appropriate amount of predefined persons — chosen by the
individual parties — has signed the transaction.
Bitcoin appears to offer at worst an option and at best a solution to the perceived
issues of trust between citizens and the operations of government, and, private and public
banks. It stands to threaten the monopoly of banks over connecting lenders with
borrowers, managing complex business transactions, and dictating where capital should
be invested. Blockchain can even modify the way we participate in political processes
such as voting. This can be observed by a project by Jeremy Clark and Aleks Essex
(2012). They have created a method called CommitCoin, which utilizes blockchain
technology to secure an individuals vote and restrict any political official or bad actor to
change the vote. Clark, in a similar way to Nakamoto claims that “CommitCoin allows
you to not trust anyone.”
As mentioned earlier, trust is still required by users in the protocol and the coding
that governs it. Unless every layperson is equipped with a thorough understanding of
computer programming and cryptocurrency then trusting these protocols requires a leap
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of faith. However, this has not proven to be a constraint on the growth of cryptocurrency.
Noted previously, the market capitalization for cryptocurrency has grown immensely in
the last decade. This could be due to users having such a low level of trust for current
financial institutions and seeing cryptocurrency as its disrupter. It may also be the result
of speculative action with the aim of turning a profit before a market collapse. In regards
to cryptocurrency as being a disrupter to existing financial systems, nothing is stopping it
from being an enabler. Bitcoin and blockchain are related but they are ultimately separate
ingredients in the cryptosphere. This means that the ability to harness blockchain
technology is possible by current financial institutions. These technical innovations could
disrupt the status quo, decentralizing the perceived monopoly power of banks, or be
seized and integrated within the present framework. As the CEO of JPMorgan is
simultaneously embracing blockchain but dismissing Bitcoin it seems unlikely that these
new applications will change how banking is done (Kim 2017).
This creates a set of fundamental questions, such as: What is money? Where does
it come from? Why do we use it? What gives it value? How should control over it be
assigned? The concept of money is not easy to define. It is an essential component in
conducting any economic transaction. It can perform some essential functions such as
being a unit of account, a medium of exchange, a store of value, and a means of deferred
payments. The questions formerly posed can be addressed through different economic
perspectives. In the next chapter, we will discuss the nature of money from the Austrian
economic perspective. This perspective is chosen because Austrian economists are
known to be critics of fractional reserve systems, government and overspending due to
excess credit.
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Chapter 3
Austrian Economic Theory on Cryptocurrencies as Money
Austrian economics is a school of thought in economics that is renowned for advocating
liberalism, individualism, and free-market activism. Austrian economics can be traced
back to the works of Carl Menger — from the University of Vienna. Prima facie,
Austrian economics would welcome Bitcoin with open arms. This is, however, not
necessarily the case and to understand why this chapter will discuss the Austrian view on
money, its regression theorem, and complications with the interpretation of Bitcoin.
Before that this section will overview relevant fundamental characteristics of their
economic approach.
Austrian theorists dismiss the idea that demand propels the business cycle for a
supply side argument. For example, Austrians argue that low interest rates can cause
over-investment. Consequently, over-investment will cause over-production and
destabilize the economy. If a crisis does occur then supply declines until it stabilizes with
overall demand starting a new business cycle. In this view, inflation is not the root of the
problem, but over-investment in response to lower interest rates — an artificial signal
created by a central bank that influences entrepreneurs — leads to a crisis in the
economy. Accordingly, these signals create a mismatch between consumer desires and
entrepreneurial efforts. If currency is created faster than the growth of goods and services
it can lead to inflation. Possibly increasing the mean price of goods and services due to a
higher circulating supply of currency. Essentially, Austrian economists hold that the
government should not simply pump money arbitrarily into circulation and instead find
the ‘natural rate of interest’ to avoid economic decline. In this way, the creation of more
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money results in the value of money decreasing and an increase in the exchange-ratio for
goods and services. Consequently, the prices of goods and services are viewed as signals
and these signals could be distorting the decision-making of producers. The ‘natural’
interest rate is one that courts the necessary amount of investment for equilibrium
employment and price stability. There is no central authority determining the interest rate
of BTC and ultimately market participants (such as nodes, users and developers)
delineate everything within the network.
The supply of BTC is predetermined and the rate at which they are issued is
predictable based on the computing power available and difficulty of mining. This could
be recognized as a ‘natural rate of inflation’ until the total supply of BTC is mined.
Further, Bitcoin does not have any government that can control its circulation; it is all up
to the participants in the market to perform the necessary tasks to issue BTC. So does
Bitcoin align with the theoretical roots of the Austrian approach? This chapter will now
discuss the Austrian approach on the functions of money before discussing the regression
theorem — a praxeological argument on the origins of money — and why complications
arise between their framework and Bitcoin.

3.1 The Functions of Money

A definition of money accepted by the Austrian tradition is that money is a medium of
exchange that is liquid and universally accepted. Mises (1912, 32) notes:
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[A]n inevitable tendency for the less marketable of the series of goods
used as media of exchange to be one by one rejected until at last only a
single commodity remained, which was universally employed as a
medium of exchange: in a word, money.

Austrians argue that other functions of money such as a measure and store of
value may be seen as secondary to the function as a universally accepted medium of
exchange. The secondary functions may appear as the medium achieves more
acceptability. Schlichter (2011) states that, “[a]ll additional functions that can be assigned
to money are the result of money being the accepted medium of exchange.” Similarly, it
is argued by Menger (1871) that traits such as a ‘measure of value’ and a ‘store of value’
are not intrinsic to moneyness “since these functions are of a merely accidental nature
and are not an essential part of the concept of money.”
There is controversy with calling BTC money among Austrian economists.
Pattison (2011) asks: “But if Bitcoin is not money, what is it?” This can be reframed as:
Because BTC is not generally accepted as a medium of exchange it cannot be called
money. However there are some market actors who voluntarily exchange real goods and
services for BTC. Although it may not be a universal medium of exchange it is a medium
of exchange. Further, based on an interpretation of Mises and Menger, it appears that the
distinction between a medium of exchange and being conceptualized as money depends
on a certain degree of acceptance by social institutions. The appropriate degree of
acceptability required for a medium of exchange to become money is ambiguous. Menger
(1892, 11) designates money as the —universal medium of exchange— in absolute terms,
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that is, universality implies the acceptability by the total population. On the other hand,
Mises (1949, 398) makes the case that it must be “generally-accepted and commonlyused.” Therefore, a medium can be defined as money if it exists somewhere between
being generally accepted and universally accepted. This could mean that either everyone
or a good number of people must accept it as a medium to be money.
As of 2018, BTC has not reached the status of being generally accepted. Despite
the fact that BTC is arguably not commonly accepted and thus not money as a universal
medium of exchange, the question as to whether it can become money stands. A survey
report by the World Economic Forum (2015) claims that Bitcoin and the blockchain
would reach a “tipping point” in which it becomes widely accepted and predicts that this
will occur by 2027. If this predication is proven true, BTC will be money in accordance
with the Austrian perspective.
There remains another issue with the Austrian tradition and BTC as money that
extends beyond general acceptability. The issue relates to the emergence of Bitcoin and
specifically whether or not it aligns with Mises’s regression theorem. The regression
theorem offers an explanation for the exchange-value of money as observed today a
posteriori a period when money was valued as a commodity for having direct-use value.
Essentially, the argument follows that at one point in time money was a good being used
in barter and over time became more liquid as a frame of reference for market prices
appeared. The following section will discuss the nature of the regression theorem and the
interpretation that money must always have its origins in a commodity in order to apply
their subjective value theory to it.
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3.2 The Regression Theorem

In 1912, Mises wrote The Theory of Money and Credit as a treatise on money. He
expressed an argument tying together marginal utility and value subjectivity with money.
Accordingly, money, as any other good, has a downward sloping demand curve and an
upward sloping supply curve. Mises demonstrates that money is demanded for exchanges
in the future. It is composed of a demand by actors who desire it for future utility and a
preserving force by the actors that hold it. The regression theorem is an attempt to
account for the historical content underlying the exchange value of money today. This
subjectivist-marginalist view maintains that exchange value represents the marginal
utility of market actors. A medium of exchange or money is a particular item that an actor
accepts or trades for a good or service they consume. An actor does not consume money
itself but instead uses it to attain the item they desire to consume. If money derives its
value by utility via consumption then the relationship between a medium of exchange and
its perceived value is ambiguous: How does an actor value an item they plan to use as a
medium of exchange and not directly consume? The regression theorem attempts to
explain the value of money and reconcile it with the subjectivist-marginalist approach.
Mises (1912, 109) argues that “[t]he price of money, like other prices, is determined in
the last resort by the subjective valuations of buyers and sellers. But … the subjective
use-value of money, which coincides with its subjective exchange-value, is nothing but
the anticipated use-value of the things that are to be bought with it.” In this way, the issue
is how these anticipations of use-value manifest. Mises emphasizes that there is a chain
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of causality linking the distant past to the exchange value of money in contemporary
times. The link revolves around an exchange-ratio between a medium of exchange and
commodities. Varying exchange-ratios over time create reference points used in future
valuations of money. Therefore the exchange-value of money in the past holds relative
significance to the present and future valuation of money. The current exchange-ratio of
money is a link in a chain of dynamic and sequential exchange-ratios. This logic appears
to digress into infinity, but the regression theorem proposes that there was a critical
moment in time where money was valued by its ability to be consumed.
In The Theory of Money and Credit, Mises (1912) disagreed with other
perspectives on how money is valued. In the eyes of Mises, Menger laid the theoretical
foundation for the technical features of money, but does not adequately express the
subjective valuation of money. Mises (1912, 116) claims:

Neither Menger, nor any of the many investigators who have tried to
follow him, have even so much as attempted to solve the fundamental
problem of the value of money. Broadly speaking, they have occupied
themselves with checking and developing the traditional views and here
and there expounding them more correctly and precisely, but they have
not provided an answer to the question: What are the determinants of the
objective exchange-value of money?

Since the exchange-value of money emerges from a chronological arrangement of
exchange-values doesn’t this become a circular argument? According to Mises, it does
not, because the regression analysis goes back until the emergence of a universal medium
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of exchange out of a direct-exchange economy. Preceding that, the item (or commodity)
is only valued for its direct usages. As follows, Mises explains that monies present
demand can be traced to a final exchange under a barter economy. By ending the
regression on that final exchange Mises attempts to avoid circularity in his logic.
The regression theorem is ultimately an argument based on praxeological
deductions (Mises 1949). The methodological approach of praxeology is custom for
Austrian economists. A central principle to praxeological deductions is that market actors
are rational and optimal in pursuit of their desires. This assumption contrasts to market
actors as being impulsive, unaware, and, aimless. Following this logic, the theory has two
unique components. The foremost segment applies the marginal utility theory to money.
Subsequently, the second component addresses the origination of money, demonstrating
that there is no logical fallacy in the theorem, and the transition from a market based on
equivalent bartering to indirect exchange. In regards to the second component, Mises
(1912, 110) claims:

[T]he objective exchange-value of money must always be linked with a
pre-existing market exchange- ratio between money and other economic
goods (since otherwise individuals would not be in a position to estimate
the value of the money), it follows that an object cannot be used as
money unless, at the moment when its use as money begins, it already
possesses an objective exchange-value based on some other use.
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In this passage Mises refers to the origin of a unique form of money that arises from a
barter economy in which there were no preceding ratios between the price of goods and
the newly emergent money. It follows that, the second component of the regression
theorem only explains the beginning of money ex nihilo. It accounts for how a barter
economy transitions into a monetary based economy where economic exchange is carried
through as a matter of course. It is erroneous to believe that the theory claims any
possible mediums of exchange require an objective exchange-value in direct-exchange
following the development of a framework of exchange-values that can be used as a
reference. Further, it does not have anything to say about the origination of any possible
universal or secondary medium of exchange.
This implies that a medium of exchange, such as fiat money, or BTC, can peg its
exchange-ratio onto any pre-existing framework with referable exchange-values.
Following this logic, a new medium of exchange does not need to begin as an actual
commodity non-monetary use in order to become a universally accepted medium. The
only requirement is that exchange-values can be followed back to a time when a variety
of directly used objects functioned as money, and ultimately to the period where an
object experienced its final usage in a direct-exchange. The regression theorem does not
attempt to clearly address the motivations for actors to establish a specific currency,
replace preceding mediums or continue their usage. Furthermore, it cannot explain the
amount in which a new medium is exchanged with earlier forms. The praxeological
argument, in respect to the regression theorem, only suggests that it contradicts logic for a
new universally accepted medium to manifest without a preceding framework of
exchange-ratios in place. If there are no market prices that can be referenced, market
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actors cannot make economic estimations using new money. Hence, if no price ratios
have been set in terms of money then market actors can only trade objects directly for an
object of equivalence. The praxeological deduction does not imply any strict guidelines
on the motivations during a transition from trading objects directly to indirectly. There is
no criterion stating newly emergent mediums of exchange must be fixed to a specific
price-ratio or legally redeemable for an older medium. It simply contends the idea that a
new universally accepted medium of exchange can manifest without a pre-existing price
framework.

3.1 Controversy with Bitcoin and the Regression Theorem

Generally speaking, the regression theorem aims to express how a universal medium of
exchange achieves its exchange value. Mises (1912, 111) illustrates that, “[b]efore an
economic good begins to function as money it must already possess exchange-value
based on some other cause than its monetary functions.” A crucial deduction from Mises
in relation to the origin of money is that it is a prodigy of the market.
A common critique of Bitcoin from the Austrian perspective is that it does not
comply with the regression theorem. This section will overview these complications and
discusses the nature of the regression theorem. Pattison (2011, 9) argues that “[b]itcoin
does not hold up as a legitimate money … because it did not begin as a commodity
money and therefore has no intrinsic value and violates Mises’ Regression Theorem.”
Generally, this problem can be summed up as follows: the regression theorem points out
that the manifestation of a new money for indirect exchange stems from being previously
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valued for its characteristics in direct-exchange. According to Pattinson’s argument, if the
regression theory is accepted BTC must first be valued as a commodity for directexchange before ever becoming a legitimate form of money. Following this logic, BTC
being used as a medium of exchange must disprove Mises because BTC did not emerge
as a commodity from direct-exchange.
Graf (2013a, 2013b) defends BTC claiming that its emergence is in line with the
theory of regression because it was valued directly. Graf frames his argument around
different motivations for why actors could have previously valued BTC and Bitcoin. He
believes these motivations may range from BTC as being a way to test the Bitcoin
network or as promoting an ideological cause. Graf asserts that there is no need to
suppose that a universal medium of exchange must begin as a physical object as opposed
to being intangible. Further, Graf believes that all goods should be considered as
contenders for becoming money, regardless of whether they have any physical qualities.
In parallel with this notion Surda (2017) argues that one can only refute BTC as
money by denying the a priori assumptions of the regression theory. Surda supposes that
the regression theorem claims money must originate as a commodity. Hence, if BTC is
being used as money then Surda suggests it is essential that it once had value as a
commodity for direct-exchange. Surda tries to explain the direct use-value of BTC as
being based on ambiguous motivations. The arguments from Graf and Surda can be
framed in the following way: the regression theorem implies that all money requires a
prior existence as a commodity and since the theory is intact BTC must have had (or has)
value in direct-exchange. According to this view, it does not matter if economists are
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unaware of the rationale of market actors to value and exchange BTC. This logic is infact circular since Surda assumes the regression theorem is an absolute truth.
Both of these arguments misinterpret the regression theorem. As noted in the
previous discussion on the regression theorem, it is not attempting to explain a property,
such as being previously used as a commodity, which may be true for something to
become money. It is a praxeological argument that delves into how money could have
emerged from a state in which money did not previously exist. Bitcoin has not emerged
during a state of pure barter and just like fiat; it does not require a non-monetary use in
order to gain the status as money. The only thing implied by the regression theory that
could restrict the adoption of BTC as a universally accepted medium of exchange is a
pre-existing framework of exchange-ratios. Hypothetically, if BTC became a universal
medium of exchange, the money regression could look like this: BTC → USD → Minted
gold and silver → all the way back to a commodity oriented barter economy. However, if
a global crisis caused all relevant information on exchange-ratios to disappear, and the
regression theorem is true, then BTC could not emerge directly as money. The heart of
this argument is that the economy must be first monetized with exchange-ratios in some
particular commodities, and then mediums without intrinsic value — such as BTC or fiat
money—could become prevalent in exchange. This point will be expounded on in the
following summary.
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3.2 Summary
Based on the previous discussions, a formulation of the regression theorem can ordered
following the way Mises (1912) argued:

1.

Once a medium of exchange is sufficiently liquid, it can,
hypothetically, sustain itself through increasing adoption even if it
does not have non-monetary uses, as liquidity creates demand.
This medium may or may not have value in direct use, be tangible,
backed or redeemable for anything, but must emerge in a market
that already has a framework of prices.

2.

Before a medium of exchange emerges it requires liquidity.

3.

Before a medium of exchange is liquid it requires a price.

4.

A catallactic sequence influences price and liquidity. This process
is fundamentally a market phenomenon that emerges from a barterstate.

5.

The price and liquidity of a medium emerging from a barter
economy is established after it already had direct-use value as a
commodity.

The original price and liquidity of commodity money is determined by its nonmonetary functions. Therefore, commodity money obeys the logic of the regression. Fiat
money obeys the logic of the regression since pre-existing money determines its
exchange-ratio, and its liquidity is achieved through collective faith. BTC obeys the
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regression theorem, as it manifests when there is an existing framework of exchangevalues in place. As far as the regression is concerned it is irrelevant to question whether
or not BTC has had any value in direct use before being used for indirect exchange. Since
a pre-existing framework of exchange-values was in place, the regression theorem does
not dispute the emergence of BTC. Respectively, an integral component BTC required
for use via indirect-exchange was the trust and confidence in its protocol by the actors
that initially procured it. Inquiring into the rationale of market actors, and, the qualities of
BTC that influenced decision-making is not within the boundaries of discussion for
praxeological rhetoric or Mises’ regression theory.
In the next chapter, the issue of BTC as being considered a functional alternative
to fiat money will be discussed through the lens of a Modern Monetary Theorist. This
view was chosen because it contrasts with the Austrian tradition and in some ways is
antithetical. For example, an Austrian economist might claim that central planners distort
the market by creating artificial signals that result in a misallocation of resources —
laying the foundation for a market collapse. Austrians tend to take the position that
governments are exogenous institutions that impede on our individual freedoms. On the
other hand, Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) views the government as having the
capacity to ensure market stability and full employment, and combat inflation. Therefore,
the way MMT views the functions of money and its application through government will
be examined followed by a discussion on how MMT approaches BTC as an alternative to
fiat money.
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Chapter 4
Modern Monetary Theory on Cryptocurrencies as Money

Before examining the view of Modern Monetary Theorists on cryptocurrencies this
chapter will first overview some of their theoretical starting points. Modern Monetary
Theory (MMT) is a collection of ideas that attempt to offer a clear understanding of the
dynamics in a —modern—monetary system (such as a fiat system). A crux of MMT is
that a monetarily sovereign government, a currency-issuing country, is not constrained by
the fear of insolvency (Pierce 2013). Since a monetarily sovereign government
determines the level of production for its legal tender it can always create currency to pay
debts. For example, a government such as the US or Japan, can spend money into
existence without collecting taxes or accruing foreign debt and it can do this with digital
tallies (the majority of money exists only in digital form) (Carrillo 2017). In this way,
when the government spends money into existence they are stimulating the circular flow
between consumption and production whereas collecting taxes is a means to extinguish
the currency. Eric Tymoigne explains (2014, 644):

A logical conclusion is that the injection of government currency through
expenditures or advances to other sectors (initial finance) must occur
before the destruction of currency through tax enforcement and
repayment of advances (final finance). Currency must be injected before
it is destroyed.
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Moreover, federal taxation and bond offerings exist as tools used to reduce
circulating money from the economy. According to Tymoigne (2014), these tools can be
used to modify the distribution of resources, incentives and stabilize both prices and
interest rates. The imposition of taxes acts as a mechanism that reduces the disposable
income of firms and households while destroying the government currency and hence
that maintains the value of the medium of exchange. The tax is a drain from the circular
flow and creates final demand for the currency. Such is the case that a monetarily
sovereign government can spend before saving. Instead, taxes may be used to control
inflation, leaving less money available for spending (Tymoigne 2014). Essentially, a
monetarily sovereign government has the capacity to manipulate numerical values on
accounting entries for the economy. In this fashion, government deficits have different
implications for proponents of MMT as opposed to Austrian economists. As Pierce
(2013) claims “[v]irtually all economic commentary and punditry today, whether in
America, Europe or most other places, is based on ideas about the monetary system
which are not merely confused – they are starkly and comprehensively counter-factual.”
From the MMT perspective “the reality … has always been that government spending
has come first and taxation later” and therefore “[w]e must revisit the concept of the
national debt itself and recognize it for the national equity it is in reality. We have only
saddled ourselves with this debt delusion because we have forgotten what the true
relationship actually is between public spending and taxation” (Cook 2013).
As Pierce (2013) points out, we tend to forget that if the government does not
spend, the economy cannot receive income, therefore the political debate on government
deficits is erroneous and potentially dangerous. Logically, this is because a government
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that produces its own currency and requires it for taxation must first put it into
circulation. Therefore, the political discourse of a sovereign government should be goal
oriented and concerned with full employment and price stability (Pierce 2013). Along
these lines, MMT opposes suggestions that inflation can be handled with a certain level
of unemployment (Pierce 2013).
The implications of MMT are that unless a sovereign country (that issues its own
currency) is running a trade surplus, it is essential that a government incur a deficit to
guarantee that there is enough money in the economy for GDP to grow and achieve the
goals of full employment and price stability. Consider that an imperative component to
GDP growth is the sales of goods and services. If a business cannot sell its products, it
will reduce capacity, reducing employment and production, causing GDP growth to slow
down. For the economy to grow, goods to be purchased and sold, and, there needs to be
an adequate supply and turnover of money in the economy for spending. Behaviors of
individuals such as saving, paying off private debts, and the concentration of money in
the hands of hoarders, must be considered in policy-making because they all reduce the
amount of money circulating in the economy. The behavior of government is different
from individuals that must worry about saving to spend. Instead, the role of the
government is to moderate the circulating supply of money with specific goals that
benefit the general public. This begs the question of what exactly is an adequate supply of
money circulating and how does an economy achieve that status? In order to answer this
question the following section will discuss the functions of money from the MMT
perspective.
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4.1 Overview of the State Approach to Money

Unlike the Austrian economics interpretation of the origins of money MMT does not
believe money emerged following the existence of markets. Instead, money is viewed as
a mixture between contracts and legal efforts from a state-like authority. This perspective
— the state or Chartalist approach — is the bedrock of MMT. Essentially, an
authoritative role enforces an obligation (a liability) using a legal structure and an elected
unit of account in order to measure the commitment. The following section is an
overview of some literature from Knapp, Keynes, Ingham, and Wray in order to
understand the state approach to money that is underlying MMT.
In the regression theorem, the origins of money are traced back to a period when
governments do not exist and there is only pure-barter. For Knapp (1924), one cannot
reasonably suppose that a monetary system can exist without a state and the value of
money has nothing to do with any precious metals but the notion that they are accepted
by private and public entities (such as banks and the state). He believed that all debts are
described by a unit of value, which can be used as a means of payment and this
description could change over time. Thus, debts in this sense are nominal and can be
characterized by the different forms they take.
Knapp (1924, 31-2) frames the state approach to money by explaining that,
“[w]hen we give up our coats in the cloak-room of a theatre, we receive a tin disc of a
given size bearing a sign, perhaps a number. There is nothing more on it, but this ticket or
market has legal significance; it is a proof that I am entitled to demand the return of my
coat.” He continues to explain the irrelevance of the form it takes, “[t]he “ticket is then a
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good expression … for a movable, shaped object bearing signs, to which legal ordinance
gives a use independent of its material. Our means of payment, then, whether coins or
warrants posses the above-named qualities: they are pay-tokens, or tickets used as a
means of payment… Our means of payment have this token, or Chartal form,” then he
explains the importance of an authoritative legal structure, “money is a creation of law …
it is a creation of the legislative activity of the state, a creation of legislative policy”
(Knapp 1924, 40).
However, the legislative policy in itself is not what gives money its value, instead
it is a decision by the state, “[t]he laws do not decide what shall be valuta money … for
they are powerless against their creator, the State” (Knapp 1924, 111). The state grants
money its value when it determines that it will use a unit for its own expenditures and
therefore accepts that unit as a means to settle debts. Innes (1913, 1914, 1932) echoes this
belief and traces the conception of debt-based relationships to the tribal arrangement
referred to as wergild that obviated conflict between different clans or families. This
practice added a cost to injury and/or murder because the family of the victim would be
compensated for their loss. Wergild was established in a legal framework and certain
people would be appointed to recall the debts in order to give them a degree of
authenticity (Ingham 2004a). This is a representation of the power authorities hold in
establishing credit and debit relations. In this case, an authority imposes an obligation —
a liability — articulated in a generally acceptable mode that is then used to benchmark
that obligation. The argument can be re-framed: as far back as historical records show,
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authorities have been setting prices in units they determine to satisfy obligations between
different actors.8
Wray (2014a) illustrates this argument, explaining that historical records from
Babylonia show that authorities set prices for the most vital goods and services and that
“[o]nce prices in money were established, it was a short technical leap to creation of
markets.” This argument contradicts the Austrian approach because it claims that a
monetary unit and framework for prices emerges before the need for markets.
Keynes understanding of money, influenced by Knapp and Innes, anticipated the
development of MMT.9 As follows, Keynes supposed that modern forms of money and
their role as recording information, “comes into existence along with Debts, which are
contracts for deferred payment, and Price-Lists, which are offers of contracts for sale or
purchase” (Keynes 1930, 3). He claims that money “in the shape of which a store of
General Purchasing Power is held, derives its character from its relationship to the
Money-of Account, since the debts and prices must first have been expressed in terms of
the latter” (3). He defines the money-of-account as “the description or title” and money is
the item that “answers to the description” (3-4).
Keynes (1930, 4) saw the importance of an authority in determining the monetary
unit and enforcing its use:

The State, therefore, comes in first of all as the authority of law which
enforces the payment of the thing which corresponds to the name or
description in the contracts, But it comes in doubly when, in addition, it
8
9

For a more detailed historical account see Hudson (2004) and Ingham (2004a, 2004b).
See Ingham (2013a, 6)
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claims the right to determine and declare what thing corresponds to the
name, and to vary its declaration from time to time – when that is to say,
it claims the right to re-edit the dictionary. This right is claimed by all
modern states and has been so claimed for some four thousand years at
least.

He also believed that the forms of state money could vary between three types
that can exist without any determinant casual link between them but instead are at the
will of the authority. These three forms are “[c]ommodity money, fiat money and
managed money, the last two being sub-species of Representative Money” (Keynes 1930,
7). He describes commodity money as the “actual units of a particular freely-obtainable,
non-monopolized commodity which happens to have been chosen for the familiar
purposes of money,” or as receipts representing “existing units of the commodity” (7).
Fiat money as, “created and issued by the State, but is not convertible by law into
anything other than itself, and has no fixed value” (7). Managed money as, “Fiat Money,
except that the State undertakes to manage the conditions of its issue in such a way that,
by convertibility or otherwise, it shall have a determinant value” (8). The character of the
monetary system is ultimately determined by the wishes of the state as it can reconfigure
its defining traits at will. For instance, a state has the ability to transition from a fiat
monetary system (where there is no commitment to a exchange for a reserve unit) to a
form of managed money (allowing the issued notes to be converted for a reserve unit).
This can happen in any order and does not resemble the regression analysis laid out by
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Mises that requires a sequence unfolding to a particular moment where a commodity
emerged from a pure barter economy.
Fitting cryptocurrencies into one of these forms is particularly difficult. However,
as will be mentioned later, MMT recognizes cryptocurrencies more as commodity money
than any other form. Generally speaking, a commodity is a product or service that
experiences fungibility in varying degrees. In a sense, BTC appears to fit this description,
as every unit is treated as a perfect equivalent regardless of the node that first received it.
However, this is a narrow view of cryptocurrencies, as such, when one considers the
whole cryptosphere, each protocol and their respective units, they represent a degree of
product differentiation. Hence, from an aerial view of the cryptocurrency ecosystem, the
degree of fungibility that may exist within a particular protocol can experience nullity
depending on the wishes of users operating under different protocols. These elements
range from distinct branding, functionality for users, the protocols interface and their
perceived instrumentality. Examples of traditional commodities consist of gold, wheat,
corn, or, crude oil. Unlike cryptocurrencies, these commodities have a tangible form.
Further, while products — consumables — tend to be forged using a commodity as an
input this is not necessarily true inversely. Yet, with cryptocurrencies they are intangible
and synthesized utilizing other physical commodities (such as computers). Specifying the
form of money — defined by Keynes — that represents a best fit for cryptocurrencies is
difficult. I believe they transcend these definitions but may be best represented as a subspecies of commodity money.10

10

This is an investigation that goes beyond the scope of this paper hitherto but will be
examined further and included as I continue my research.
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Keynes postulated that the “Age of State Money” could be traced back to over
4,000 years ago (Keynes 1930, 5). Keynes applies the state theory of money to every
economy observed through known historical texts, claiming they were either based on
commodity money, fiat money, or managed money. MMT piggybacks off Keynes’s idea
that the era of state money began when the state authorities “claimed the right not only to
enforce the dictionary but also to write the dictionary” (5). This understanding of money
has influenced how MMT views the functions of money in conjunction with fiscal,
monetary and general policy options. The next section will overview the functions of
money from the MMT perspective.

4.2 The Functions of Money

MMT tells us that a sovereign country that issues its own currency creates demand by
forcing their citizens to pay taxes with it (Wray 2014b). In the US a citizen is forced to
pay taxes in US dollars, therefore citizens must acquire US dollars. In contemplation on
the existence of ‘modern’ or ‘fiat’ money, it is clear that it does not grow on trees, but
must be produced by a country’s central bank. In the US the Federal Reserve Bank
assumes this role. The form that money can take in these institutions is as bank notes or
key-strokes on a computer (Carrillo 2017). So then how does money created by the
government come into circulation? Consider the divergences between the government
and private sector. If the country is monetarily sovereign the government does not have
any real budget constraints. Contrarily the private sector, being composed of the private
domestic sector (goods and services produced bought and sold within the country) and
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the private foreign sector (goods and services imported and exported to and from other
countries), is budget constrained, meaning it must have money before it can spend.
Therefore, money can be seen as brought into circulation when the government finances
government services and when the government buys directly from the private sector. The
idea that a government can produce its own currency means that it can buy anything for
sale in the country — in its own currency — without ever being insolvent. More
importantly, it can spend first without having to collect taxes. This is the essence of
MMT and a major reason why followers of this approach would conceptualize a budget
deficit as being better than a budget surplus. Be that as it may, a budget deficit is not
without its own dangers, as Pierce (2014) maintains “[t]his doesn’t mean that
governments can spend without limit, or overspend without causing inflation, or that
government should spend any sum unwisely. What it emphatically does mean is that no
such sovereign government can be forced to tolerate mass unemployment because of the
state of its finances – no matter what that state happens to be.”
As follows, money can function as a means, under a monetarily sovereign
government, to combat unemployment and create price stability. Consider how the
private sector and public sector relate to the budget according to MMT. When the amount
of money the government spends is exactly equal to taxes collected, the government is
said to be running a balanced budget. If government spending is greater than the taxes
collected, the government is running a deficit while the private sector experiences a
surplus. If the government spends less than it is collecting in taxes, the government is
running a surplus while the private sector experiences a deficit. MMT proponents argue
in favor of a deficit that satisfies an unmet demand for money, establishes full
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employment and encourages economic growth. Mosler notes in his correspondence with
Armstrong (2015):

MMT recognizes that the currency is a public monopoly, taxes function
to create unemployment and the funds used to make payments to the
government come from the government. The price level is a function of
prices paid by the government and loans create both deposits and
required reserves. The national debt is nothing more than the dollars
spent by the government that haven’t been used to pay taxes and remain
outstanding as ‘net savings’ in the economy until used to pay taxes. They
‘rest’ in the form of cash, reserve balances at the Fed and balances in
securities accounts at the Fed.

Of course, a government could orient policy for a budget surplus but this would
cause the private sector to be in a deficit unless the country experienced a trade surplus.
Consider that the US has been importing more than they export consistently since the
1980s. MMT recognizes that to reduce government debt or achieve a budget surplus
either public welfare can be reduced or taxes on the private sector can be increased
(Pierce 2014). The latter would drain the private sector of liquidity and increase private
sector debts. As a consequence, reducing the circulation of money to unburden the
government from debt obligations reduces the economy’s capacity to spend which may
stunt economic growth.
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Prior to 1971 in the US, state-issued money was backed by the total amount of
gold. In this case, a government can become insolvent. However, following the adoption
of a state-issued money that cannot be redeemed for gold and the ability of countries to
float the value of their own currencies, the elements of a commodity-backed system no
longer apply. US dollars are spent into existence (this could not be the case with gold).
Congress determines the appropriate quota for government expenditures and tax
guidelines. By a matter of force the IRS and respective legal system ordain taxation,
which drives the currency, upon the economy. Technically speaking, the US government
cannot fully deplete its own currency. As long as the sum of money borrowed and
interests are measured by the respective currency, the government may print or issue
reserves to satisfy debt obligations. Essentially, this implies that the scarcity of money is
a political decision. The debt ceiling is an arbitrary limit on monetary units that the
federal government borrows. But this does not mean that there are no consequences for
excessive public expenditures. MMT still views inflation as a pressure, but provides a
unique way of combating it. A function of taxes is to combat inflation and maintain price
stability (Armstrong 2015). If there is too much money in the economy, which may cause
inflation, taxes can be used to destroy any excess money from the economy. To keep the
amount of money at a level for the private sector to function properly and maintain price
control, the government can use taxation, or encourage private savings and the purchase
of imports. Alternatively, to ensure that there is an adequate supply of money in the
economy, a government can add more money with government spending, or encourage
private investment and exporting. In this way, taxes are a lever that the government uses
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to take money out of the private sector to maintain price stability and prevent excess
inflation.
MMT focuses on achieving price stability and full employment, by using money
as a tool. For example, a government offering a job to the unemployed rather than
keeping them unemployed can anchor prices and combat inflation. The guaranteed job,
which could be at minimum wage, sets a price floor for wages, provides a source of
income and can provide the necessary skills to transition to the private sector. Using
money in this way allows the government to utilize the full capacity of labor and provides
a measure of how large a government deficit should be (an amount adequate for full
employment). This provides an alternative to the long-run Phillips curve (the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment). For example, if inflation becomes too high,
pressure can be reduced by transferring labor from the private sector to the ‘buffer stock.’

4.3 Bitcoin and Modern Monetary Theory

From the perspective of MMT, questions such as, why does the U.S. dollar have value?
Why are people willing to work and produce in order to obtain it? Can be answered by
recalling the way in which they view the functions of money. The value of the currency is
connected with peoples need to settle obligations with the government. Ultimately, the
US dollar has final demand because of taxes; inter alia, the government’s ability to make
us write contracts and produce using the US dollar. Proponents of MMT claim that
Bitcoin does not have anybody standing behind it enforcing rules and laws, and, requiring
people to make payments with it.
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In essence Bitcoin lacks government backing and confidence and trust necessary
to maintain its value; it has no final demand because no government accepts it for tax
payment. Although this is currently true, it may change with the recent passage of
SB1091 in the Arizona Senate titled “Income tax payments; bitcoin” (Peterson,
Farnsworth, Grantham and Weninger 2018). Along with the introduction of SB464 in the
Georgia Senate titled “Taxes and License Fees; state revenue commissioner to accept
cryptocurrencies for payment” (Williams 2018). In 2017, Sweden became the first
country to settle a debt using BTC (Petcher 2017). Further, the Arizona governor
officially signed a blockchain bill, HB 2417, that states, “[a] contract relating to a
transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability” (Weninger 2018).
There are a few arguments coming from MMT perspective against the
functionality of BTC as an alternative monetary instrument. The rest of this section will
briefly overview their position that BTC are “not monetary instruments” (Tymoigne
2013b). Tymoigne (2013b) states that:

Given that bitcoins are supposed to be monetary instruments, they must
follow the preceding basic rules of finance. We clearly know who the
bearers are ... but who is the issuer? In other words, who put the eggs in
the forest and is willing to accept them in payments due to him or her. I
can tell you the answer for Easter eggs: none of the persons who put
them in the forest promised to accept them in payments.
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First, recall that the Bitcoin protocol allows nodes (miners) to create blocks and in
return are rewarded BTC. Now, there is no issuer that resembles a Federal Reserve or
central bank, but the responsibility of issuance is on the user. When a block is constructed
there is a special transaction called a ‘coinbase transaction’ that allows the miners to
assign BTC to themselves (or any address on the Bitcoin network chosen as an output).
As long as the necessary proof-of-work is provided with the block, other nodes in the
community will accept that issuance of BTC to the miner. The network and the growing
adoption of Bitcoin ultimately determine the current circulating supply. For all practical
purposes, the ‘eggs’ were placed in the forest by Nakamoto (since they are coded into the
protocol) and it is the nodes that are forced to accept them for performing the necessary
amount of proof-of-work for the continued operation of the system. In this way, the miner
is a mediator in the distribution of BTC and by operating as a node promises to accept
only BTC for performing the tasks deemed necessary by the protocol to ensure the
honesty of the network. Conceptually, it is the community of nodes that play the role of
the central bank. It could be said that Bitcoin is a bank and BTC are liabilities of that
bank, placed in circulation by the community itself at a rate dependent on the supply of
nodes and demand for verification of transactions. Tymoigne (2013b) further asserts that
“[g]old coins are ... monetary instruments that contain only one promise, that of being
accepted back by the issuer to settle debts due to him (usually a government)” and
“[p]rivate banks issued notes that they would not accept in payments ... Bitcoins have no
intrinsic value so their fair value would drop to zero.” If nodes can be conceptualized as
mediating the issuance of the currency, and the protocol requires that nodes accept BTC
for performing work, is it fair to claim that this requirement by the protocol is not a
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promise in itself? As long as the US government is solvent, US dollars will be accepted
as tax payments by law; as long as the Bitcoin network has users willing to operate within
its protocol, BTC must be accepted as a fee for validating transactions and is enforced via
rules governed by its code. Accordingly, taxation is a legal obligation that forcefully
creates a final demand for USD. Further, the obligation of users to accept BTC for
verifying transactions and continue to operate in line with the governing rules of the
Bitcoin protocol is a voluntary means of creating demand for BTC.
Another criticism from Tymoigne (2013b) is that the supply of BTC is
imminently inelastic and:

If a monetary instrument works properly, its supply changes with the
quantity demanded. It goes up when there is more demand for it, and
down when there is less demand for it ... The bitcoin supply is fixed in
terms of flow (BTC 25 per 10 minutes now) and in terms of maximum
outstanding amount (BTC 21 millions).

In a simple model where Bitcoin exists in a vacuum and is not open-source, this
statement is true. However, that is not representative of reality, Bitcoin Core (the name of
the software that enables the use of the currency) is open source. This means that if the
supply of 21 million is hit and excess demand for BTC exists, theoretically, the
community could agree on forking Bitcoin (which has already happened in order to
increase transaction speed) and increasing its supply while maintaining the rest of the
rules in the original protocol (Hearn 2015). Further, the community could even organize
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and change the rules of the protocol to suit whatever is required by this hypothetical
demand. Concerning the destruction component of a currency, the protocol could be
changed in the future to allow for part of the transaction fee to be payable to the system
itself, destroying it endogenously. This may be complemented by setting the protocol to
increase circulating supply at a given (variable or fixed) target-rate for inflation.
It is quite clear that proponents of MMT do not believe that BTC (possibly even
other cryptocurrencies) can function as an alternative to fiat money or be considered as a
monetary instrument. Be that as it may, they maintain that it has other uses (Tymoigne
2013):
The structure of the payment system, not bitcoins, is actually what makes
the bitcoin project so successful. It is supposedly so secretive that you
can trade a bunch of illegal stuff and evade taxes. Think Easter eggs (or
tulips) for coke, Easter eggs for guns, Easter eggs for prostitutes, the sky
is the limit …

And Wray (2013) asserts that “bitcoins have no use other than to circulate illegal
products” and “[a]s long as we’ve got cokeheads, bitcoins have value because cokeheads
will take them.” According to this logic, it appears as if cokeheads give BTC a type of
final demand.
These claims most likely stem from criticisms of the infamous Silk Road network,
which was an online black market for drugs and other illicit goods. Ross Ulbricht was not
only arrested for his free-market economic experiment, Silk Road, but his BTC were
traced to his identity and seized (Haun 2017). Further, the DEA special agents Carl Force
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and Shaun Bridges tasked with investigating Ulbricht were caught committing fraud by
Kathryn Haun, a former US attorney for the US Department of Justice (Haun 2017).
Special agents Force and Bridges believed that Bitcoin was anonymous, and, so secretive
that one could get away with illegal activity, but failed to realize that anyone can examine
the blockchain ledger and trace the movement of BTC. Haun (2017, 5) discovered a
digital trail on the blockchain that revealed the transaction history showing that the DEA
agents were embezzling hundreds of thousands of dollars in digital currency during the
case. Any type of crime that can involve cash can also be committed with digital currency
(Haun 2017). The difference is that it may have been even more difficult to catch the
corrupt DEA agents if they were using cash, as the blockchain ledger is an immutable
copy of every transaction that has every occurred in the network (Haun 2017, 6). In
Haun’s (2017) testimony before the US House of Representatives Committee on
Financial Services and Subcommittee on Terrorism and Illicit Finance she claimed that:

There are plenty of legitimate uses of cryptocurrencies ... I know many
small business owners, investors, academics, and even government
employees who use cryptocurrency. These are not people engaged in
illicit activity but rather people looking to take advantage of a more open
and seamless system to transact with one another ... Cryptocurrencies
also promote financial inclusion for the unbanked, including in parts of
the world that lack stable financial institutions.

Further Haun (2017) argues that:
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[E]arly misuse is a fact of life with many emerging technologies, and
cryptocurrency is no exception ... Although we now all use the internet
every day, in the beginning it was disproportionately used by those
engaged in nefarious behavior – for things ranging from child porn to
online fraud. With each technological advance, bad actors figure out how
to exploit and there is some period where law enforcement plays catch
up, a kind of cycle of innovation and adaption . . . The potential for
terrorist use of cryptocurrencies certainly exists, as it exists for cash or
any asset . . . To date we have seen only limited instances of terrorists
using cryptocurrencies

And regarding cryptocurrencies versus other means to finance illegal behavior, Haun
(2017) remarks that:

Cash and prepaid cards are two prime examples. There is little reason to
use a digital currency account where your IP address may be tracked
with each login, there is a permanent record to trace where the funds
came from and where they moved to.

4.4 Summary
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MMT is a powerful framework for understanding a monetarily sovereign government and
its policy pursuing full employment and price stability. At the heart of MMT is a
monetarily sovereign government operating as a monopolistic supplier of money, which
has an unlimited capacity to spend on other sectors. Being in a surplus is consequently a
bad thing, because that means the government is absorbing more money via taxation than
what is being injected into the economy. This is because they are withdrawing money,
which can be conceptualized as a claim on resources, from every other sector in the
economy.
In turn, MMT’s optimism for modern financial institutions compared to older
forms that relied on a gold standard is in part due to their capacity to increase liquidity.
Under the gold standard system governments could not spend as much as they wanted in
order to provide public goods and services. Since the transition from a monetary system
backed by a commodity to a promise of redemption for taxation, MMT argues that
governments can spend up until full employment is achieved. The scarcity of the USD in
this way is artificial and constrained by misconceptions of its operations. It follows that
the options for the application of government spending to ensure a degree of subsistence
for its population — in a modern monetary system — are vast. Thus, a monetarily
sovereign government’s decision between austerity measures and spending jobs into
existence, raising living standards and wages, is a sociopolitical decision.
As noted earlier in the chapter, Tymoigne (2014) challenges BTC as being a
monetary instrument and deems it to be a commodity. The underlying argument is that if
BTC is a commodity then it is an awful monetary instrument with no final demand. This
is based on a conception of BTC as being similar to gold and not being accepted as
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means to settle debt obligations. A monetarily sovereign government giving up its ability
to spend money into existence and reverting back to gold would be disastrous in the
MMT framework. The gold standard was limited by the total amount of gold available,
which constrained the capacity of government spending. This constraint could arguably
fail at keeping up with population and economic growth. Depending on the relative
scarcity of gold at a given time, increasing amounts of goods and services could cause a
deflationary spiral or limit economic growth by the rate at which gold is extracted. The
nature of this argument will be followed up on in the conclusion.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Money plays an irrefutable role in the arrangement and functioning of interconnected
economic processes. It exists as a channel between firms and households, the laborer and
his or her product, the producer and the means of production; it is inescapable and
pervasive in modern economies. Money can be divisive between different socioeconomic
classes in hierarchical social structures. Thorstein Veblen’s view on institutions is unique
in the sense that he believed them to be “not only themselves the result of a selective and
adaptive process which shapes the prevailing or dominant types of spiritual attitudes and
aptitudes; they are at the same time special methods of life and of human relations”
(Veblen 1889, 188). Inevitably hierarchies of money fuse with the varying institutions of
its respective communities through habitual function in their lives. Veblen could be
interpreted as implying that institutions are symbolic arrays representative of orderly
patterns of human activity to procure certain material conditions. Accordingly, money
can then be interpreted as a symbol that can be quickly recognized by its users for
embedding — both formal and informal — culturally relevant forms of trust through
norms and rules.
MMT characterizes money as the creation of the state and emphasize the bond
between the state and its issuance of currency. Austrian economics, for all practical
purposes, views money as a system of signaling the wishes of individuals that has been
seized, controlled and distorted by the state. However, both frameworks recognize the
monopolistic control the state has over money. In this way, money can symbolize the
power of the state. The former believes that the consolidation of this power can be used
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to appropriately solve issues of unemployment, price stability, and resource allocation.
The latter purports that this consolidation of power will deliver very limited economic
performance and infringes upon the capability of individuals. Both frameworks
ultimately desire similar outcomes such as full employment, economic growth, price
stability, and, proper resource allocation, but they reach their goals in different ways.
The phrase “In God We Trust” has become a prominent element on the US dollar
since 1957. It is a reflection of the influence monotheism has had in western civilization.
It also exists as an example of how symbols can court the trust of its users. Monotheism,
a belief in a singular god, or a singular authority, it not a unique means of courting that
trust. A misconception about Bitcoin is that it eliminates the need for trust in consolidated
authorities — or third parties — and is ‘trustless’ as Nakamoto puts it (2008).
Cryptocurrencies are becoming more interconnected and potentially even interdependent
with traditional financial systems. BTC could not have emerged without the necessary
development of particular financial institutions. Further, it cannot survive without the
current institutional infrastructure and the trust they have accumulated. It is possible to
trade cryptocurrency pairs, such as BTC for Litecoin, but the only way to enter the
cryptocurrency market is to purchase BTC with a state-issued currency. Individuals who
seemingly trust their own currency (since they use it) exchange it for BTC. The rise in
popularity Bitcoin has received may reflect a transition of social trust. Bitcoin by itself
does not produce or dispose of trust, it allows for trust to take on a new form. Instead of
trusting traditional financial institutions backed by governments users extend their trust
into technology. However, this is not a unique transition particular to finance and is more
obvious in other sectors. For example, people trust that their GPS will guide them to
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where they want to go. A key component to cryptocurrency is the decentralization of
trust, not the elimination of it. Could Bitcoin be a reflection of people losing faith in
traditional monetary systems? Regardless, this trust ultimately emerges from the social
provisioning process and is propelled by technical and cultural changes.
Users who hand over their trust — symbolized as state-issued currency — for
BTC are transforming their trust into the support of a technological development. This
technological development offers a sense of monetary freedom. However, the supposed
monetary freedom from the state via cryptocurrency does not imply freedom from
potential tyranny of the market. Arguably, cryptocurrency is a social institution that aims
for market-based centralization over coercive centralization. As MMT makes clear,
monetarily sovereign governments manage and control their currency and have the power
to penalize citizens who do not obey their rules (such as paying taxes and settling debts in
their respective currency). In this sense, the centralization of control over the creation of
money and the trust backing it is forced. With cryptocurrencies market actors are able to
opt out or even switch currencies without having to deal with any specific oversight.
Trust in money can be observed as being the result of a social process, cultural
trait, or a financial institution. In social processes trust emerges when there is a
framework of pre-existing inputs and predictable retribution. This may influence other
social institutions such as cultural norms and taboos. For example, students trust that their
studious efforts will pay off with their degree that will earn them an income. Similarly,
when a student asks a teacher a question s/he trusts the authoritative role of the teacher as
being credible enough for an appropriate answer. Trust created by a cultural trait is trust
held for recognizable features that feel familiar to our cultural experience. For example, a
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person may instill more trust in someone who shares similar values over one who does
not. Trust as a result of financial institutions emerges from the interdependent
relationship between the government, the household and firm, and the central bank (In
the case of the Federal Reserve the central bank is different from the government).
Supplanting this logic, trust can be displaced if the social process, the familiar cultural
trait, or the financial institutions that are trusted fails. Verification of transactions on
Bitcoin is accomplished by the network itself, trust is mitigated from singular entities
(such as a central bank) to voluntary participants (the nodes). Those who purchase BTC
with money, with or without awareness, place trust in the technology and code governing
the protocol.
A general conclusion I want to make is that cryptocurrency can be an alternative
to fiat money as long as trust exists. Cryptocurrencies can exist as a partial-complement
to the current monetary systems or potentially displace it if governments decide to legally
accept it for debt obligations. If people are capable of trusting a government issued
currency and exchanging it for a cryptocurrency — that cannot be used to pay taxes with
— they are also capable of trusting a cryptocurrency to function as a means of exchange.
There is no reason that this technology cannot be harnessed by governments and displace
their respective monetary system endogenously. Bitcoin, among other cryptocurrencies,
are open-source and may be modified by any person with the right technical proficiency
to encode an application that aligns with their political values. Currently, cryptocurrency
is an ambitious experiment and if it replaces fiat money it will not be due to being
trustless. Instead, it will be because they are trusted for functioning better than then the
alternative. This may be the result of faster clearing times, cheaper fees, their
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immutability, inclusiveness, being open-source, or their ability to disintermediate and
automate costly financial relationships through smart-contracts. Cryptocurrency is still in
an early stage of development but its existence begs some very fundamental questions on
the nature of monetary systems. Envisage a monetary system that is maintained and
governed through community-ownership. Blockchain, in the form of Bitcoin, represents a
protocol that is ran by the users for the users. There is no private owner of Bitcoin, it is
not a private company, and, nodes are not forced by any overarching social institutions to
perform tasks for an exploitive wage.
As of now, BTC is a unit accepted by a relatively small-community as a store of
value, a means of payment, a unit of account, and, a means of exchange. The question of
whether or not it can be an alternative to fiat money can be reframed as: Can BTC
establish enough users on the network to provide the right amount of credibility and
liquidity to be trusted on a global scale? This is an open-ended question, but Bitcoin has
undoubtedly grown its network size since its conception. Current institutions, such as
centralized crypto-exchanges, price trades of BTC within the boundary of exchangeratios with the US dollar (among other currencies). In order for it to be trusted on a global
scale there is a need for people to start thinking in terms of BTC opposed state-issued
currency. This adoption could occur due to a growing distrust for the behavioral patterns
of traditional financial institutions. However, it could also emerge from those same
institutions embracing the technology and forcing it upon users. Currently, the volatility
of BTC in terms of USD makes this a difficult burden for producers and consumers that
want to maintain their livelihood. As retailers are starting to accept BTC for goods and
services it is unlikely that they are enthusiastic about holding onto something volatile. On

59

the other hand, volatility could be encouraging adoption by luring in speculative actors. If
BTC is to become a legitimate currency it must gradually become preferable to preexisting options for transactions. Hence, it can be said that money functions as long as
actors are confident in its ability to be accepted by someone else. Hypothetically, if gold
regained its claim as a generally accepted medium there would be nothing backing it of
equal value. Now imagine that there is no government to promise accepting gold, or treat
it as a liability, where does it gain its value? Beyond its potential usefulness for jewelry,
false teeth, or other conspicuous displays of wealth, if a general confidence in gold’s
capacity to function as money magically disappeared, it would be worth relatively little.
This argument also holds true for government-issued fiat money if the government stops
accepting it.
The Austrian tradition, specifically Mises’s regression theorem, states that for an
item with the status of a medium of exchange, a schema of pre-existing exchange-ratios
must already be in place. The regression theory, through a praxeological examination,
determines that the very first medium of exchange must have emerged from a state of
barter and used in direct exchange. However, it does not imply that all mediums of
exchange must transition from direct exchange. There is no logical reason to assume,
within this framework, that BTC cannot achieve the necessary amount of liquidity to
become a primary or generally accepted medium of exchange.
To put it in a different way, the liquidity of money is essential for money to
function appropriately in both economic perspectives. The Austrian school praises the
nature of liquidity from a free market, where as MMT believes liquidity is best
administered by a monetarily sovereign government. This is why when an MMT theorist
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examines a cryptocurrency, such as Bitcoin, which has no central authority and a limited
supply (reminiscent of a commodity such as gold), could claim that it would be a bad
monetary instrument. However, this view fails to acknowledge the dynamics of
cryptocurrency and the implications of Bitcoin as being an open-source application. Since
Bitcoin is open-source there is nothing stopping an actor from modifying the code and
creating their own rules for governing its respective network. Further, if users
participating in the new network found the rules to be unsatisfactory they can either opt
out and use another cryptocurrency or vote to fork the protocol. During a fork, the
blockchain of a cryptocurrency experiences a schism into two forms of itself. Generally
speaking, this occurs when stakeholders — participating nodes or developers — hold
conflicting ideas on the development of the cryptocurrency. In essence, the dynamics of
forking can be viewed as a process of voting for new systems of governance. It allows
actors to express their concerns and create a network that aligns with their personal
values and preferences. Instead of lobbying or fundraising for a change in policy, forking
a cryptocurrency lets actors design what they believe will be a better system. Hence,
MMT’s perceived constraints of a commodity-backed currency do not apply to BTC.
Hypothetically, if the limit of BTC were to be reached and fears of a deflationary spiral
emerged, actors could fork Bitcoin, while maintaining or changing the governing rules,
and increase the supply of BTC to meet excess demand. In spite of this, until BTC — or
any cryptocurrency — is issued or accepted as a means of settling debts by a government,
it is not considered a monetary instrument from the MMT perspective.
The blockchain application through Bitcoin is only one cryptocurrency that could
act as an alternative to fiat money. Being the first cryptocurrency of its kind has elicited a
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certain reputation and dominance in the crypto-market. Yet, the future of cryptocurrency
is uncertain and Bitcoin could be replaced by a competing cryptocurrency. Nonetheless,
the evolution of money proves that the same thing can be said about any traditional
currency. If trust is the heart of money, then as long as cryptocurrencies continue their
trajectory of adoption, it is probable that their liquidity will increase due to their function
as a medium of exchange and non-monetary applications (such as smart contracts and
voting mentioned previously). A global transition from fiat-systems to cryptocurrencies is
beyond the control of any individual. Should this occur, traditional currencies would
likely lose their value and new institutions would need to be developed in order to adapt.
They could also exist as a complementary system that provides a check on fiat money,
allowing users to perform capital flight and apply pressure to their respective government
that is not following their wishes. Change is not easy, but it is also not impossible.
Cryptocurrencies could certainly operate as an alternative means of performing the
functions of fiat money — especially in the absence of institutions that provide trust. Be
that as it may, if cryptocurrencies will ever become money is an issue that can only be
addressed with patience.
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